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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to identify trends in CG-47 Operating and Support (O&S) 
costs and determine if costs, specifically maintenance costs, are increasing as the 
platforms in the ship class age. O&S data from FY1987 to FY2010 supplied by the Naval 
Center for Cost Analysis were used to analyze trends and create statistical models for 
analyzing the relationship between cost and age.  This thesis is intended to supplement a 
similar statistical analysis performed by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), which 
analyzed CG-47 O&S costs from FY1984 to FY1999 and found no significant 
relationship between costs and age.  Additionally, concerns in the Navy’s current surface 
fleet force-structure plans will be summarized and analyzed to establish relevance and 
background. 
Analysis of O&S cost data in this thesis yielded results that differed from the 
2002 IDA report, and showed a statistically significant relationship between platform age 
and maintenance costs. 
This analysis is intended to aid in future naval leadership decisions on how best to 
achieve the desired force structure of the fleet.  Conclusions drawn from this thesis will 
contribute relevant cost prediction insight that could greatly impact future decisions 
between extending the life of active surface combatants versus developing and procuring 
new ships.  Predictions of future maintenance funding requirements drawn from this 
thesis can be incorporated into ship service-life decisions and potentially improve cost 
forecast accuracy and legitimacy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Is there a relationship between the age of a ship and the amount of money that 
must be spent to maintain it at a desired level of material and operational readiness?  
With the U.S. Navy’s plans to extend the service life of CG-47 class cruisers, and cancel 
the development of its new cruiser CG(X), a closer look at costs associated with the aging 
fleet of cruisers is needed to establish trends and better predict future costs for the ship 
class (Director, Warfare Integration, 2010).  This thesis will serve as an analysis of CG-
47 Operating and Support (O&S) costs from Fiscal Year (FY) 1987 to FY2010. It is 
aimed at aiding in future naval leadership decisions between extending the life of active 
surface combatants and developing and procuring new ships. 
The trade-off decision between building new ships and extending ship service 
lives is significant given that a relatively small service life increase can have a substantial 
impact on procurement budgeting and force structure planning (Koenig, Nalchajian, & 
Hootman, 2009).  While the scope of this analysis is limited to trend analysis of average 
cost per year in specific O&S categories from the CG-47 class, any correlation 
established between platform age and cost is intended to serve as a catalyst for future, 
more detailed analysis analogously applicable to multiple ship classes. 
In 2002, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) published a report looking for 
what effect, if any, age had on the Operating and Support (O&S) costs of the CG-47 
class.  Using O&S cost data from 1984 to 1999, IDA found that “the O&S costs of the 
CG-47 fail to show the consistent rise in age that we would expect” (Devers & Levine, 
2002, p. I-2)1.  One potential explanation for the lack of correlation between O&S costs 
and ship age offered in the report was, “the question of whether CG-47s might still be too 
young for age to have taken its toll, and that the older naval surface combatants might 
show a consistent upward trend” (Devers et al., p. I-3).  This theory that the CG-47 class 
might have been collectively “too young” during the analysis period ending in 1999 has 
                                                 
1 The IDA report, Effect of Age on Operating and Support Costs of CG-47 Class Cruisers, used O&S 
costs beginning in 1984, which was the first complete fiscal year for the CG-47 Class Cruiser (Devers & 
Levine).  
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merit since the oldest ship of the class of 27 ships had only 14 years of service at the 
time2 of the report.  In 2010, 22 of the original 27-ship CG-47 class remained in service 
with an expected service life of 35 years or more (Director, Warfare Integration, 2010)3.  
The oldest ship of the 22 cruisers that remain active, USS Bunker Hill (CG-52), was 
commissioned in September of 1986, and has now been in service for 24 years.  With ten 
more years added to the collective age of the CG-47 fleet since the IDA report in March 
of 2002, an analysis of subsequent O&S cost data is relevant to establish whether a link 
between the collective age of the ship class and costs trends exists now, where none 
existed in previous analysis. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The United States Navy has enjoyed virtually uncontested supremacy in the 
world’s oceans since World War II.  Recent fiscal constraints, however, may pose a 
greater threat to U.S. sea power than any potential enemy.  To maintain naval 
effectiveness amid budgetary constrictions, the Navy has been forced to balance the 
ability to build advanced new ships with a need to depend on currently-active platforms 
to survive until the bitter end of their expected service lives.  Will the Navy’s decision to 
operate combat ships longer bring a requirement for increased maintenance funding in 
order to maintain effectiveness?  While both new ship development and the sustainment 
of existing platforms impact Navy budget decisions, the extent to which that impact 
might limit future naval capabilities warrants investigation. 
Given the availability of information and analysis from government 
organizations—such as the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), and the Congressional Research Service (CRS)—on the 
implications of fleet modernization versus fleet development, the need to summarize 
general concerns between analysts is apparent; additionally, establishing trends in 
potential risks associated with the Navy’s most current plan may be significant in aiding 
                                                 
2 The first ship of the class, USS TICONDEROGA (CG-47), was commissioned on 22 January 1983 
(Surface Warfare Directorate N76, 2009). 
3 The first five ships of the CG-47 class, CG-47 through CG 51, were decommissioned between 
August 2004 and December 2005 (Surface Warfare Directorate N76). 
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future force structure decisions.  A need exists to also determine what financial 
implications could result from operating a ship class beyond the historically reasonable 
service life.  Can operating costs, maintenance costs, and the cost of modernization 
(required to keep an aging ship relevant), be expected to continually increase over time?   
The challenge of creating a naval force structure that is both affordable and 
capable of filling the roles required to implement national policy has been a continuous 
trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness.  U.S. Navy leaders are charged with 
making decisions on how best to structure naval forces to ensure national policy can be 
carried out.  Among these decisions is the choice between funding new surface combatant 
development/procurement and obligating scarce Navy funds to the continuous 
rejuvenation of existing ships. 
1. U.S. Navy Force Structure Vision 
Each year, the Navy submits a plan to Congress outlining future force structure 
and shipbuilding requirements.  The most recent plan, entitled Report to Congress on 
Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2011, outlines the 
Navy’s vision of the surface fleet over a period of 30 years.  Given the longsighted nature 
of the plan, accurate predictions in the distant future are based more on speculation than 
fact.  In order to add accuracy, the plan is separated into three separate time periods: “the 
near term period 2011 through 2020,” which was created with the most accurate 
estimates of requirements and costs; the “mid-term requirements projected for 2021 to 
2030,” which is less precise than the near-term, and was put together using estimates of 
future ship types planned for construction; and “the far-term requirements period, from 
2031 to 2040,” which is the least accurate portion of the plan, and is anticipated to change 
based on the outcome of the first two sections of the timeline (O'Rourke, Navy Force 
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background Issues for Congress, 2010, p. 4).  
CBO and CRS experts have analyzed the Navy’s current shipbuilding plan and 
released several documents aimed at determining how ship development costs, 
procurement costs, and the cost to modernize existing ships will impact future naval force 
structure, and the Navy’s budget.  Additionally, IDA analysts have produced a report 
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intended to determine if an upward trend exists in Operating and Support (O&S) funding 
required for operating and maintaining ships over time.  Whether building new ships or 
upgrading and extending the life of older ships, budget impact analysis is required to 
ensure that the best fiscal decision is mated with the most effective means of maintaining 
naval supremacy throughout the world. 
In the FY2011 shipbuilding plan, Navy leaders opted to extend the service life of 
Aegis cruisers and destroyers4 and terminate the development of the CG(X) future cruiser 
class.  The motivation to execute this change of direction in the Navy’s shipbuilding plan 
was likely due to budgetary pressures recently introduced by Secretary of Defense Gates’ 
campaign to limit budgetary growth within the Department of Defense.  In a 2010 report 
to Congress, CRS quoted a Navy statement justifying the cancellation of the CG(X) 
program as “driven by affordability considerations” (O'Rourke, Navy CG(X) Cruiser 
Program: Background for Congress, p. 4).  Understandably, Navy leaders face a difficult 
challenge in creating long-range budgeting plans based on estimations and predictions of 
what capabilities will be required onboard ships thirty years in the future.  Accurate 
budget predictions become even more difficult with the addition of potential error 
introduced by fluctuations in labor and material costs over time. 
The Navy has based its future surface force composition on the assumption that 
ships will remain serviceable and relevant until they reach the end of their 35-40 year 
expected service lives.  Older platforms, such as the CG-47 class, will ostensibly require 
an increase in funding to cover the maintenance and modernization costs needed to keep 
the cruiser class operationally relevant, both technologically and mechanically.  The 
potential for problems associated with retrofitting new technology onto older platforms 
that have neither the space nor the support infrastructure to support the additions seems 
intuitive; however, financial pressures can drive decisions that force leaders to take 
calculated risks in order to accept budget constriction in one area that can be used to 
bolster others. 
                                                 
4 CG-47 Ticonderoga class cruisers and DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers, equipped with the 
Navy’s Aegis Combat Systems Suite are referred to as Aegis cruisers and destroyers after the shield of 
Zeus in ancient Greek mythology (O'Rourke, Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: 
Background and Issues for Congress, 2010). 
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2. Literature and Context 
In 2002, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) analyzed the relationship 
between the age of the CG-47 class of ships, and trends in the Operating and Support 
(O&S) costs associated with the class.  IDA’s analysis utilized historical O&S cost data 
provided by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) through the Visibility and 
Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) ship database.  IDA used 
linear regression in an effort to establish a relationship between the age of a ship class 
and a rising trend in the amount of money needed to maintain and operate the class in an 
effective configuration and state of material readiness. 
Linear Regression produces a coefficient of determination value known as R2 (r-
square).  R2 values can range from 0.0 to 1.0, with the smallest values indicating a weak 
or non-existent relationship between the dependent variable (cost) and the independent 
variable (age).  Larger R2 values indicate a strong relationship between variables.  In their 
linear regression analysis of CG-47 O&S cost data from 1984 to 1999, IDA was unable to 
show that O&S costs exhibit an increase as ships age (Devers et al., p. I-2).  IDA reported 
R2 values less than .01, interpreted as indicating no significant relationship between cost 
and age. 
IDA’s analysis offered several hypotheses for the inability to show a significant 
statistical relationship between O&S costs and ship age. First, they said that the class was 
possibly “too young” for age to have exerted a significant effect on the individual 
platforms (Devers, et al., p. I-3).  A second hypothesis was the possibility that, “the Navy 
might have been cutting back on CG-47 modernization spending […] either in 
anticipation of receiving additional funds for the CG-47 conversion program, or to avoid 
spending money in the event it has to decommission the ships” (Devers, et al., p. I-3).  
IDA’s concern that timing decisions in Department of the Navy (DON) budgeting may 
have affected maintenance cost trend – and therefore any subsequent analysis – was 
highlighted by their assertion that, “the effects of aging have been masked by budgeting 
idiosyncrasies” (Devers, et al., p. I-3). 
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The Navy’s ability to hold money in anticipation of additional funding, or to fund 
modernization projects with procurement appropriations (rather than O&S), could serve 
to mask trends in funding requirements for maintenance and modernization that might 
otherwise be present if funding data were more readily traceable amongst multiple 
appropriation categories.  DON funds that might otherwise be used in the development 
and procurement of new ship platforms, like the CG(X), could be reprogrammed and 
absorbed into program funding needed for modernization. 
CBO analysis of the Navy’s latest 30-year shipbuilding plan highlighted a specific 
example of idiosyncrasies in budgeting. CBO analysts noticed that the Navy budgeted 
$9.4 billion for the procurement of 15 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) over the current 
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP); however, with Congressional limits on LCS 
procurement set at $480 million per ship, the Navy would not be able to spend more than 
$7.8 billion5 for 15 LCS platforms (Labs, pp. 10-11). 
Any estimates of future funding requirements will depend heavily on the 
assumptions included in calculations.  Variation in assumptions for future costs can cause 
disparity between independent estimates of future costs associated with the same project;   
which was the case in the CBO analysis of the Navy’s 2011 shipbuilding plan.  The 
Navy’s 30-year plan estimates the need for average annual funding of $15.9 billion6 to 
build the desired 313-ship fleet (Congressional Budget Office, 2010, p. 6).  CBO 
analysis, based on independent assumptions, generated estimates of annual funding 
requirements needed to achieve the Navy’s force structure goals at $19 billion 
(Congressional Budget Office, p. 6).  This disparity between estimates is representative 
of the effect assumptions play in long-range planning.  The CBO estimate is nearly 20% 
higher than that of the Navy. 
CBO also indicated that the Navy’s planned annual ship procurement numbers 
may not be sufficient, or even realistic, to achieve the desired end state of 313 ships.  
CBO noted that, in a departure from previous plans, the Navy’s 2011 long-range 
                                                 
5 Amount adjusted for annual inflation. 
6 Monetary amounts are reported in 2010 dollars, unless otherwise noted. 
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shipbuilding plan established the 313-ship fleet as merely a baseline number, rather than 
an end-strength target.  The Navy’s long-range shipbuilding plan released in 2009 
indicated a desired increase from the Navy’s current fleet of 286 ships, to an ultimate 
target fleet size of 313 (Congressional Budget Office, p. 1).  However, when CBO 
analysts tallied the annual ship procurement requirements implied in the current 
shipbuilding plan, they discovered that the Navy’s plan mathematically implied a desired 
fleet strength of approximately 323 ships (Congressional Budget Office, p. 2).  The 
addition of 10 ships to the Navy’s target force structure brings the potential for either 
significant growth in procurement funding, or the need to keep active ships in service 
longer. 
Rather than depend on the addition of new ships to the fleet, the Navy has made 
adjustments to the expected service lives of current Aegis ships in order to reach the 
target fleet size.  In an article discussing naval force structure and the inherent 
relationship to ship service lives, Koenig, Nalchajian, and Hootman (2009) give a generic 
example of a 100-ship fleet with a service life of 25 years per ship.  The fleet will require 
four new ships per year to sustain 100 ships; however, increasing the service life to 33 
years would require only three new ships per year, which could represent a significant 
savings in procurement costs (Koenig et al., p. 73).  If the Navy’s plans for a 313-ship 
fleet are to succeed, the CG-47 and DDG-51 ships currently in operation would have to 
survive, and remain capable, until the very end of the newly adjusted service life 
expectancy.  In the CBO analysis of the Navy’s current shipbuilding plan, however, 
analysts showed that while contemporary surface combatants, like the Arleigh Burke 
class destroyers, were built to last 35 years, “the average retirement age of the past 13 
classes of cruisers and destroyers has been well below that” (Congressional Budget 
Office, p. 4). 
According to CBO, even if ships currently in service, such as the CG-47 class, 
can reach the desired service life of 35 years, the Navy would still need to average over 9 
new ships per year to keep a 323-ship fleet in operation (Congressional Budget Office, p. 
2).  Over the past two decades, the Navy has acquired an average of 6.4 ships annually; a 
rate which the CBO contests will yield a fleet strength of 224 ships over 35 years 
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(Congressional Budget Office, p. 2). The difference between CBO and Navy estimates is 
even more troubling given that, historically, Navy cruisers and destroyers “have been 
retired after 25 years of service or less” (Congressional Budget Office, p. 4).  The 
historical service life of 25 years calls into question the Navy’s decision to base the 
ability to achieve a 313-ship fleet on cruisers and destroyers lasting well beyond 30 years. 
In his testimony before Congress on January 20, 2010, CBO Senior Analyst Eric 
Labs used Under Secretary of the Navy Robert O. Work’s statement that the Navy “can 
do what we need on $15 billion a year,” to help determine how the Navy’s ship inventory 
would be affected by future budget constraints.  When comparing the required annual 
funding to execute the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan, CBO used per-ship estimates of 
$2.1 billion (used in the 2010 defense appropriation), $2.5 billion (used by the Navy in 
2009 estimates), and $2.7 billion (used by CBO in 2009 estimates) (Labs, 2010, p. 7).  
Using a $15 billion annual budget estimate, coupled with the an estimated cost per ship of 
$2.1 to $2.7 billion, Labs determined that, “with those annual budget levels and average 
ship costs, the size of the Navy’s fleet would decline over the next three decades from 
287 ships to between 170 and 240” (Labs, pp. 5–7).  CBO calculations also relied on the 
assumption that currently-active ships would achieve the 35-year service life anticipated 
by Navy leaders.  The goal of the Navy is to grow to a 313-ship fleet and then achieve a 
steady-state, defined by Labs as “the average number of ships that would have to be 
purchased each year to keep the fleet at a given size, […] equals that steady-state force 
size divided by the stated service life of a ship” (Labs, p. 5).  According to Labs, the 
Navy would have to acquire nearly 10 new ships per year to achieve a steady state with a 
313-ship inventory. 
Figure 1 illustrates the projected force levels, or number of ships, taken from the 
Navy’s long-range shipbuilding plan, along with the disparity in Navy funding estimates 
versus estimates made by CRS analysts (O'Rourke, Navy Force Structure and 
Shipbuilding Plans: Background Issues for Congress, 2010, pp. 6–7).   
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Figure 1. Navy and CBO estimated funding requirements and Navy Projected 
surface force levels based on the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 
Shipbuilding Plan. 
The Navy’s plan will grow the fleet from its current strength of 285 ships to 315 
ships by FY2020 (Director, Warfare Integration, p. 9).  After FY2020, the fleet will 
continue to grow until it peaks in size, at 320 ships, in FY2024 (Director, Warfare 
Integration, p. 9).  After peaking, the fleet will diminish steadily until the end of the 30-
year shipbuilding plan, with a low in FY2032 of 288 ships, and a total of 301 ships in 
FY2040 (Director, Warfare Integration, p. 9).  The trend in force strength is a 
representation of the Navy’s phased plan, which CBO concluded would “enable the Navy 
to reach its earlier 313-ship goal by 2020” (Congressional Budget Office, p. 2).  After the 
near-term, however, the plan shows less promise, with the fleet staying above the 313-
ship baseline for only seven years before beginning to decline.  CBO’s report also added 
that the Navy’s plan “would never achieve its implied goal of 322 or 323 ships” 
(Congressional Budget Office, p. 2).  Adding to the capricious nature of out-year 
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estimates is the fact that labor and material costs have historically grown at a faster rate 
than the overall economy (Congressional Budget Office, p. VIII).  Couple volatile labor 
and material costs with the unpredictability of future requirements and availability of 
funding, and the ability to predict force structure beyond the near term becomes 
increasingly more challenging. 
The alternative to simply purchasing the number of new ships necessary to attain 
the goal of 313 ships, is to embark on a project to modernize existing platforms in an 
effort to ensure they reach their full service life potential.  On the surface, rejuvenating 
existing ships rather than spending over $2 billion per ship to replace them, seems like a 
quick and inexpensive way to achieve a 313-ship fleet.  Seemingly, the Navy has 
determined this route to be the most affordable option, given budget constraints.  The 
Navy’s FY2010 budget submission to Congress proposed cancelling the FY2009 plan for 
building 19 CG(X) future cruisers intended to replace the aging CG-47 class (O'Rourke, 
Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for 
Congress, 2010, p. 7).  Additionally, the Navy’s plan to build as many as 24 new ships 
under the DDG-1000 program has been abridged to a total procurement of three ships for 
the entire class (Congressional Budget Office, p. 17). 
The Navy’s approach to attaining a 313-ship force has changed course since the 
last shipbuilding plan was submitted to Congress in 2009.  The development of new ship 
classes will be subordinate to modernizing and sustaining existing ships, coupled with the 
procurement of new DDG-51 class destroyers (O'Rourke, Navy Aegis Cruiser and 
Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress, pp. 1–2).  The 
procurement of new DDG-51 Aegis destroyers was ended in 2005 at a time when new 
platforms were anticipated to become available for replacement (O'Rourke, pp. 1–2).  By 
re-starting the proven DDG-51 program in 2010, the Navy likely gained the ability to 
predict future procurement costs with greater certainty. 
In the near term, the Navy plans to keep the 62 existing DDG-51 class ships in 
service beyond their originally-intended 35-year service life, by adding the destroyer 
class to the CG-47 cruiser class in their modernization plan (O'Rourke, p. 2).  The 
adjusted service life expectancy for DDG-51 class destroyers is now an impressive 40 
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years (O'Rourke, p. 2).  In addition to potential savings gained by avoiding new ship 
development, the Navy’s plan to modernize 22 CG-47 class cruisers and 62 DDG-51 
class destroyers may prove to be a cost-effective means of expanding the size of the 
current fleet, with total program costs estimates at $16.6 billion (O'Rourke, 2010, p. 1). 
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II. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS METHOD 
1. O&S Cost Data Collection 
This analysis utilizes O&S cost data supplied by the Naval Center for Cost 
Analysis (NCCA) Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
(VAMOSC) ship database. The data span from FY1987, when the oldest cruiser in this 
analysis was first operational, to the most recent year for which complete data were 
available, FY2010.  Total O&S cost is comprised of several individual categories 
including personnel, maintenance, repair parts, supplies, and fuel costs which were 
combined for the 22 ships in the CG-47 class to produce average annual O&S costs per 
ship in order to establish historical trends.  Additionally, NCCA VAMOSC was able to 
provide annual values for steaming hours, personnel assigned, and maintenance hours for 
each ship in the class.  All dollar values have been normalized to FY2010 dollar values 
using the current (Jan 2010) Joint Inflation Calculator (JIC) provided by the NCCA. 
O&S sub-categories for maintenance were further disaggregated into individual 
costs for scheduled and unscheduled depot-level maintenance, intermediate maintenance, 
and maintenance costs directly attributable to modernization.  The detailed maintenance 
cost data provided for statistical regression analysis, and enabled the development of 
more accurate cost estimation relationship (CER) development. 
2. Plan of Analysis 
This analysis is intended to provide a fresh look at CG-47 historical O&S costs, 
while maintaining continuity and comparability with the 2002 IDA report on O&S cost 
data for CG-47 class cruisers from FY1984 to FY1999.  Annual class averages in each 
sub-category of O&S were analyzed individually using historical trend analysis.  
Additionally, average annual O&S cost and average annual maintenance costs per ship 
trends were analyzed further using statistical analysis (linear regression) to determine 
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what fraction of the variation in cost, if any, could be explained by the variation in the 
age of the ship.  In order to maintain consistency throughout the chosen period, only the 
22 remaining CG-47 class cruiser statistics were included in the analysis.  While the first 
five hulls, CG-47 through CG-51, were in service for the first half of the decade, 
inclusion of their data would greatly disrupt consistency in the analysis.  To aid in direct 
comparison, all dollar values are reported in constant 2010 dollars in both analysis and 
graphs. 
Table 1 is a summary of average O&S cost per ship over the entire period of 
analysis from FY1987 to FY2010. In the interest of maintaining consistency with the 
previous IDA analysis, items in bold will be the focus of this thesis, and will receive the 
most attention. 





      Unit (Organizational Level) 37.4
         Personnel 21.5
         Material 15.9
            POL (Fuel both underway and not underway) 9.6
            Repair parts and repairables 3.4
            Supplies 0.7
            Training expendable stores (replacement ammunition) 2.2
      Intermediate-level maintenance 1.9
      Depot-level maintenance 4.4
        Repair during Scheduled maintainance availablilities 2.9
        Repair during Un-Scheduled maintainance availablilities 1.5
        Modernization 3.3
No tes : Bo ld deno tes  the  main fo cus  o f ana lys is . To ta ls  do  no t s um due  to  ro unding.
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B. HISTORICAL TREND ANALYSIS 
1. Consolidated CG-47 O&S Cost Trend Analysis 
 
Figure 2. Average Annual O&S Cost per Ship & Average CG-47 Cruiser Age  
Figure 2 shows the average O&S cost per ship for each fiscal year from FY1987 
to FY2010.  Over the 23 years analyzed, average annual O&S cost per ship increased 
over 45% from its lowest point of $29.7 million in FY1990, to its peak of $64.9 million 
in FY2007.  Over the same time period the average age of the CG-47 cruiser class 
(dashed line) rose from one year in FY1987 when only CG-52 was in service, to an 
average age of 20 years in FY2010 when all 22 ships were active. 
Total O&S contains multiple data categories that span several appropriation titles, 
including: Operations and Maintenance, Navy (OM&N); Other Procurement, Navy 
(OPN); Weapons Procurement, Navy; and Military Personnel, Navy (MPN).  While 
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several of these appropriations categories, and their associated O&S cost categories are 
ostensibly not related to platform age, other categories, for example maintenance, are 
presumably related to the age of the platform and will be analyzed in detail in subsequent 
sections. 
The trend in O&S costs shown in Figure 2 appears to follow closely with average 
platform age, with the exception of a large spike to $61M in FY1991 which followed 
Operation Desert Storm7.  The spike in O&S costs in FY1991 was largely driven my 
maintenance and replacement ammunition costs, and will be further analyzed in 
subsequent sections. 
2. Personnel Cost Trend Analysis 
 
Figure 3. Average Annual Personnel Cost per Ship & Average Number of Personnel 
Assigned 
                                                 
7 OPERATION DESERT STORM and the war between the United States and Iraq lasted from August 
1990 to April 1991 (Department of the Navy - Naval Historical Center, 1997). 
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Average annual personnel cost per ship provides an interesting trend analysis, but 
does not warrant a linear regression comparison since the number, and cost, of personnel 
assigned to a ship is not driven by the age of the platform.  Personnel costs, shown in 
Figure 3, include pay and allowances for both officer and enlisted crew members, and are 
the largest contributing category to O&S costs.  Trends in personnel cost have a 
significant impact on overall O&S trends, while behaving independent of variation in 
platform age. 
Personnel costs have been rising steadily over time.  In IDA’s analysis of CG-47 
cruisers from FY1984 to FY1999, personnel costs rose 60% (Devers & Levine, 2002).  
From FY2000 to FY2003, the average number of personnel assigned per ship increased 
8% from 361 to 393; accordingly, personnel costs increased 10% from $21.8 million to 
$24.4 million.  Since personnel costs also include entitlements like hazardous duty pay 
and eminent danger pay, the spike in FY2003 can likely be attributed to the buildup of 
naval forces associated with the “Shock and Awe” offensive8 of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) (Singal, Lim, & Stephey, 2003).  Between FY2003 and FY2009, however, a 15% 
decrease in crew size from an average of 393 down to 332 per ship, was accompanied by 
a significantly smaller decrease in average annual personnel costs per ship of less than 
5% from $24.4 million to $23.3 million.   
Figure 4 shows that the average annual cost per person assigned rose nearly 60%, 
from $46K in FY1987, to $78K in FY2010.  Given that all cost numbers have been 
adjusted to constant FY2010 dollars, a further, more detailed, analysis of personnel pay 
and benefits is warranted, but is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
                                                 
8 On March 19, 2003, the U.S.-led coalition began bombing Baghdad (Singal, Lim, & Stephey, 2003). 
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Figure 4. Average Annual Personnel Cost per Ship & Average Cost per Person 
3. Petroleum Oil and Lubricants (POL) Trend Analysis 
Fuel and oil consumption costs, like personnel costs, do not relate directly with 
the age of a ship.  Petroleum costs fluctuate with the values set by the world’s oil market, 
and consumption amounts differ with operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and required 
steaming days.  Like personnel costs, fuel costs are a significant contributor to O&S costs 
as a whole, so analysis is merited.  Figure 5 shows average POL costs per ship from 
FY1987 to FY2010, with average days steaming plotted for comparison.  Steaming days 
included both underway and not underway since ships routinely consume fuel running 




Figure 5. Average Annual POL Cost per Ship & Average Annual Steaming Hours 
As expected, POL costs closely follow average steaming days across the entire 
timeframe.  Over the timeframe analyzed from FY1987 to FY2010, average annual POL 
costs per ship closely followed changes in crude oil prices, ranging from $7.4M to 
$14.2M and maintained an average annual cost per ship of $9.6M.  Trends in annual POL 
cost per ship are much less erratic than trends in oil prices per barrel9 experienced in the 
world market during the same time period (McMahon, 2010).  Over the entire period of 
analysis, crude oil prices rose a total of 217%, from $33 per barrel in FY1987 to $72 per 
barrel in FY2010.  Between FY1999 and FY2010 crude oil prices showed a dramatic 
increase of nearly 450% from a low of $16 per barrel in FY1998, to $72 per barrel in 
FY2010.  While price per barrel figures used to illustrate world oil market trends may 
differ from oil prices paid by the government during that period, market price trends do 
                                                 
9 “Prices are adjusted for Inflation to June 2010 prices using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) as 
presented by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Prices are based on historical free market (stripper) prices of 
Illinois Crude as presented by IOGA (McMahon, 2010).” 
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serve as a valid comparison to help explain historical increases revealed in POL cost 
trend analysis. Figure 6 shows average annual POL cost per ship plotted with a crude oil 
price per barrel trend line covering the same period. 
 
Figure 6. Average Annual POL Cost per Ship versus Inflation Adjusted Crude Oil 
Price per Barrel 
4. Ammunition Cost Trend Analysis 
Ammunition replacement cost trend analysis is included here, both to maintain 
consistency with IDA’s report on O&S costs, and to highlight the contribution 
ammunition replacement has to overall O&S trends.  The key takeaway from Figure 7 is 
the spike in average ammunition replacement cost per ship to $12.3M in FY1991.  The 
spike in cost represented in Figure 7 is consistent with other O&S cost sub-categories, 
and adds to the overall O&S cost spike that followed the Gulf War in 1991. 
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Ammunition replacement costs, shown in Figure 7, provide a much less 
significant contribution to overall O&S costs than the previously discussed categories of 
personnel and POL costs.  Average annual ammunition replacement costs include both 
ammo expended in operations and ammo used in training exercises.  Additionally, 
replacement costs for expended acoustic sonobuoys were included in the overall 
ammunition figures.  During the course of the timeframe plotted in Figure 7, average 
annual ammunition replacement costs declined steadily from $4.7M per ship in FY1987 
to $311K per ship in FY2010. 
Figure 7. Average Annual Replacement Ammunition Cost per Ship 
5. Maintenance Cost Trend Analysis 
Maintenance costs, as the second largest contributor to overall O&S costs, is a 
monetarily significant category and capable of influencing overall O&S costs 
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dramatically.  Additionally, maintenance provides the most ostensibly plausible 
relationship to platform age of all the O&S cost categories previously discussed. 
 
Figure 8. Average Annual Maintenance Cost per Ship and Average Annual Depot-
Level Maintenance Man-Days per Ship 
Included in average annual maintenance costs per ship are scheduled and non-
scheduled depot maintenance, intermediate-level maintenance, and fleet modernization.  
Fleet modernization10 is a maintenance program scheduled to outfit each cruiser in the 
CG-47 class with systems upgrades that will enable the ships to maintain military 
relevance throughout the duration of the ship’s intended service life of 35 years (Director, 
Warfare Integration (OPNAV N8F).  Modernization, as a one-time program designed to 
 
                                                 
10 Fleet modernization will “improve the CG-47 Ticonderoga class by modernizing the computing and 
display infrastructure, and the Hull, Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) systems. Weapons and sensor sets 
will also be improved, […], as well as routine machinery upgrades to improve all areas of ship 
functionality” (OPNAV N8F). 
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upgrade and update an entire class, will be analyzed both in a consolidated maintenance 
cost trend graph, and in a separate trend analysis. Fleet modernization costs represent a 
cost directly associated with maintaining an aging ship class. 
Figure 8 shows the average annual maintenance cost per ship, plotted with 
average annual maintenance man-days for comparison.  Annual maintenance cost for 
each ship—with the maintenance sub-categories of scheduled depot maintenance, un-
scheduled depot maintenance, modernization, and “other,”—were consolidated into a 
single average for each year. 
Overall, average annual maintenance cost per ship increased drastically during the 
period analyzed; however, changes in average maintenance costs do not appear to follow 
fluctuations in depot-level maintenance man-days.  The lack of correlation between 
maintenance cost and maintenance time is counter-intuitive since an increase in 
maintenance time would, seemingly, cause a similar change in the overall cost to 
maintain the ship. 
Figure 8 also shows a notable doubling of maintenance costs between FY2006 
and FY2007 from $9 million to $18.7 million. This timeframe coincides with the 
beginning of the CG-47 fleet modernization program.  The dramatic, upward trend 
starting in FY2007 continues through FY2010, and may be indicative of future 
maintenance cost. 
Figure 9 shows average annual depot maintenance cost per ship plotted with 
average depot maintenance man-days.  Once the two depot-level maintenance sub-
categories, scheduled and un-scheduled, are plotted independent of other maintenance 
cost sub-categories, the depot cost trend line follows much more closely with 
maintenance man-days, and exhibits the correlation originally expected between 















































Figure 9. Average Annual Depot-Level Maintenance Cost per Ship and Average 
Annual Depot Man-Days per Ship 
Figure 10 features the overall trend in scheduled depot maintenance independent 
of other maintenance sub-categories.  Scheduled depot maintenance, including Type 
Commander (TYCOM), and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) shipyard maintenance 
periods, shows a fluctuating, but steadily upward trend during the period analyzed. 
Figure 11 shows a consistent trend in un-scheduled depot-level maintenance cost 
throughout most of the period analyzed; however, the trend line increases exponentially 
after FY2006.  Between FY1987 and FY2006, average annual un-scheduled maintenance 
cost per ship never exceeded $1.8M.  Interestingly, from FY2006 to FY2009 the average 
per ship cost of un-scheduled depot-level maintenance rose from $1.75M to $5.6M, 
before dropping off slightly to $4M per ship in FY2010. 
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Figure 10. Average Annual Scheduled Depot-Level Maintenance Cost per Ship 
 
Figure 11. Average Annual Un-Scheduled Depot-Level Maintenance Cost per Ship 
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Figure 12 plots average annual modernization cost per ship independent of all 
other maintenance cost sub-categories.  Modernization cost shows no readily-discernable 
trend, and peaks spread consistently throughout the period analyzed. 
 
Figure 12. Average annual modernization cost per ship 
While upward trends appear to exist in most of the O&S cost categories analyzed, 
age, along with steaming hours, likely have the greatest affect on maintenance costs and 
will be the focus of regression analysis in the following chapter. Other cost categories, 
while significant contributors to overall O&S cost, will not be explored any further 
beyond the level already discussed. 
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C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
1. Regression Introduction 
For this section of analysis, maintenance cost data were separated from all other 
O&S cost categories, and then further disaggregated into the five maintenance cost sub-
categories of Scheduled Depot Maintenance, Unscheduled Depot Maintenance, 
Modernization, Intermediate Maintenance, and Other Maintenance.  Individual 
maintenance cost sub-categories were analyzed by creating separate regression models 
for each that focused on the relationship between platform age and maintenance cost, 
holding all other factors constant. 
While regression analysis is expected to show that platform age is linked to an 
upward trend in maintenance cost over time, there are factors other than platform age that 
could affect the age-cost relationship and should be addressed.  For this reason, steaming 
hours were included in each regression model to account for any effect operational tempo 
(OPTEMPO), or platform utilization, could have on maintenance cost.  Steaming hours 
are endogenous to maintenance costs, since more maintenance cost would ostensibly 
indicate more down time and less steaming hours.  Thus, one-year lagged, and two-year 
lagged steaming variables were used. 
The addition of variables accounting for the effects of platform utilization, 
specifically captured in steaming hours, was a logical way to account for any year-based 
effects that may have been introduced by changes in maintenance funding.  The two 
“lagged” variables for steaming hours were present in the regression models for each of 
the five maintenance cost sub-categories. 
Additional steps were taken in the regression analysis to minimize any effect one 
ship might have on the maintenance cost predictions for the entire class; specifically, if 
one ship had an abnormally large maintenance cost in a single year that could not be 
attributed to platform age.  For example, in February 1991, USS Princeton (CG-59) 
struck two mines in the Persian Gulf causing hull and superstructure damage.  The 
damage caused by Princeton’s mine strikes, while certainly contributing to subsequent 
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maintenance costs, have no connection to the age of the platform.  Similarly, other types 
of damage may affect maintenance costs while having no relationship with platform age.  
An example of an event unrelated to platform age that increased maintenance cost is USS 
Port Royal (CG-73), which ran aground off the coast of Oahu, Hawaii in 2009.  The 
grounding caused significant damage and contributed to subsequent maintenance costs 
associated with that particular platform in the following year.  In order to minimize the 
effect of any single platform, dummy variables for each of the 22 ships were utilized in 
each regression model.  These dummy variables enable the regression model to calculate 
individual mean values for each of the 22 ships included in the analysis. 
Finally, after multiple trial regression models, a limit of $10M was set for the 
annual maintenance costs of any individual ship.  By eliminating cost observations 
greater than $10M, the regression analysis showed results of much greater accuracy, and 
future projections will be possible utilizing the Cost Estimation Relationships (CER) 
established here. 
2. Regression Model Statistical Results Summary 
Table 2.   Regression Model Statistical Results 





































Sample Size 235 373 352 372 369




Table 2 provides a summary of regression model results, and displays the 
statistical significance of each coefficient.  Coefficient values in Table 2 are in FY2010 
dollars, and were used in subsequent sections to produce graphical representations of the 
regression results from each maintenance cost sub-category.  Standard error values were 
included for each coefficient value as a representation of potential error in the regression 
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model results.  Throughout the regression analysis, only active ships were used in the 
creation of average values.  Of the 22 ships in the CG-47 class, only CG-52 is present for 
each of the 23 years included in the regression models from FY1987 to FY2010.  Cost 
data for the remaining ships were included as each ship was commissioned and active for 
a full year of service. 
Coefficient values in Table 2 have been annotated with asterisks indicating 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  These significance levels, based 
on p-values from the regression models, are considered significant for this analysis, and 
indicate where the relationship between a particular variable and cost is unlikely to be 
coincidence. 
Of the five maintenance cost sub-categories analyzed, age had a positive and 
significant effect on the costs associated with four, at least at the 5% significance level.  
The largest effect of age was in Intermediate-Level Maintenance, which had a coefficient 
of $209K at the at the 1% significance level.  Additionally, previous year steaming hours  
appear to have a positive effect on both Scheduled and Un-Scheduled Depot-Level 
Maintenance, while steaming hours from two years prior effect Intermediate-Level 
Maintenance positively.  Interestingly, steaming hours from two years prior have a 
negative and significant effect on Modernization costs. 
Results shown in Table 2 are expanded and analyzed in detail in subsequent 
sections. The summary of regression data in Table 2 illustrates a statistically significant 
relationship between age and maintenance cost that was not present in previous studies.  
Additionally, coefficient values for Modernization costs indicate a decrease in cost as 
platforms age.  The behavior of Modernization costs relative to platform age is 
investigated in greater detail in later sections. 
3. Scheduled Depot-Level Maintenance Cost Regression Analysis 
As discussed previously in trend analysis, the Scheduled Depot-Level 
Maintenance cost category is comprised of costs associated with Type Commander 
(TYCOM), and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) shipyard maintenance periods.  
TYCOM and CNO maintenance periods, or availabilities, are planned far in advance; 
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however, all levels of shipboard maintenance are likely accomplished during these 
maintenance periods where ships are non-operational for several months consecutively. 
Figure 13 gives graphical representation of the regression model results for 
Scheduled Depot-Level Maintenance generated under the assumptions and limitations 
discussed in the previous section.  Regression results have been plotted along with the 
original VAMOSC per ship annual average costs data for Scheduled Depot-Level 
Maintenance for comparison.  With the drastic fluctuations in Scheduled Depot-Level 
Maintenance costs, an accurate prediction of future costs using regression is not ideal; 
however, the regression line generated in this analysis does visually show the relationship 
between maintenance costs and platform age, holding other factors constant, and shows a 
readily discernable upward trend in costs.  In the years plotted, estimated cost for average 
annual Scheduled Depot-Level Maintenance per ship rose from $1.8M to $3.8M, while 
the actual average per ship cost rose similarly from $1.8M per ship in FY1991, to a per 
ship annual average of $4.8M in FY2010. 
 
Figure 13. Estimated Platform Age Relationship to Average Annual Scheduled 
Depot-Level Maintenance Cost per Ship 
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In light of the upward trend in the age-cost relationship shown in Figure 13, a 
future estimate of average annual Scheduled Maintenance cost was made.  Although 
forecasting future maintenance costs based on highly variable data is potentially 
inaccurate, a prediction based on the regression model plotted in Figure 13 provided 
reasonable and seemingly realistic values.  Based on the expected service life of 35 years 
for each of the 22 CG-47 class platforms, Scheduled Depot-Level Maintenance cost can 
be expected to continue to rise steadily in the future from an annual per ship average cost 
of $3.8M in FY2010, to a predicted value of $5.5M per ship in FY2029 when the final 
ship in the class would reach 35 years of service.  This prediction was based only on 
those ships scheduled to be active in each year based on the generic 35-year service life 
expectation. 
4. Unscheduled Depot-Level Maintenance Cost Regression Analysis 
 
Figure 14. Estimated Platform Age Relationship to Average Annual Un-Scheduled 
Depot-Level Maintenance Cost per Ship 
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Like Scheduled Depot-Level Maintenance, regression analysis of Un-Scheduled 
Depot-Level Maintenance costs gave similarly expected results.  The estimated cost-age 
relationship line produced in regression model trials visually fits the data nicely, and 
shows a significant upward trend over time, increasing from an annual per ship average 
estimate of $127K in FY1989, to $3.2M per ship in FY2010.  The spike in the original 
VAMOSC data in Figure 14 for Un-Scheduled Depot-Level Maintenance costs in 
FY2009 can be attributed to $58M spent repairing USS Port Royal (CG-73) following 
her grounding off the coast of Oahu, Hawaii. 
5. Modernization Cost Regression Analysis 
 
Figure 15. Estimated Platform Age Relationship to Average Annual Modernization 
Cost per Ship 
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Regression analysis of Modernization cost yielded results less anticipated than 
other maintenance cost sub-categories, and required a great deal of effort in interpretation 
of regression model results.  Figure 15 shows the line representing the estimated 
relationship between platform age and average annual Modernization cost per ship 
plotted with the original VAMOSC Modernization data for comparison.  Unexpectedly, 
the Modernization cost estimate line developed for this analysis shows a decrease in 
Modernization cost as platforms age.  Previously discussed controls and assumptions 
incorporated into the regression model have controlled for volatility in the underlying 
data, and enabled the estimation line to better represent the relationship between 
Modernization costs and the age of the platforms. 
Pursuit of a suitable explanation for diminishing Modernization costs over the 
lifecycle of the CG-47 class led to three potential hypotheses.  First, funding for Aegis 
Cruiser Modernization is funded through appropriations other than Operations and 
Maintenance, Navy (OMN), and is difficult to isolate into a single, analyzable database.  
For example, the President’s FY2011 budget submission requested Modernization 
funding of $357M for CG-47 modernization and $296.7M for DDG-51 modernization 
under the Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) appropriation rather than Operations and 
Maintenance, Navy (OM&N), which is represented in this analysis (O'Rourke, Navy 
Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress). 
The second potential explanation for the age-cost relationship depicted in Figure 
15 is that Modernization for the 22 CG-47 class cruisers makes up a minority portion of a 
much larger ship modernization plan that includes 62 DDG-51 Arleigh-Burke class 
destroyers (PEO Ships).  Given the large number of DDGs, and their expected service life 
of 40 years per ship, the CG-47 class cruisers would ostensibly receive a proportionately 
smaller fraction of the total planned Modernization budget.  To date, only three CG-47 
class cruisers have completed the Modernization process.  Additionally, funding for only 
one CG-47 class cruiser was included in the President’s FY2011 budget submission, 
compared to a funding request for three DDG-51 destroyers (O'Rourke, Navy Aegis 
Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress). 
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A third potential explaination for the decreasing Modernization cost estimate line 
in Figure 15 is that ship modernization is not driven by age-related requirements, but 
rather a need to maintain operational relevance.  The regression model illustrated in 
Figure 15 was designed around the anticipation that the cost to maintain a ship is related 
to the age and utilization of the platform.  The anticipated cost-age relationship has been 
apparent in other maintenance csategories analized; however, unlike maintenance 
required to offset platform utilization or damage, Modernization can be assumed to be 
driven by changes in technology, perceived enemy capabilities, or requirements 
generated independent of the requirement to maintain the functionality of systems and 
capabilities currently deployed on surface ships. 
Figure 16 shows the result of a simple regression model with average annual 
Modernization cost per ship as the dependant variable, set against the average age of the 
22 active CG-47 class cruisers as the independent variable.  Unlike all other regression 
figures in this analysis, Figure 16 does not hold other contributing factors constant.  
Interestingly, without controls for utilization, year-fixed effects, or ship-specific outliers, 
the results show a more anticipated upward trend in Modernization cost as platforms age. 
Figure 16. Simple regression model showing Estimated Platform Age Relationship to 
Average Annual Modernization Cost per Ship 
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6. Intermediate Maintenance Cost Regression Analysis 
 
Figure 17. Estimated Platform Age Relationship to Average Annual Intermediate-
Level Maintenance Cost per Ship 
Intermediate Maintenance cost regression analysis produced results consistent 
with the anticipated rise as age values increased, and showed the strongest age-cost 
relationship of all the maintenance cost sub-categories analyzed.  Disregarding the initial 
three years with negative values plotted in Figure 17, estimates for average annual 
Intermediate Maintenance cost per ship increased steadily from $57K per ship in 
FY1990—when only the first ten of the 22 total cruisers included in this analysis were 
active—to over $4.2M per ship annually in FY2010.  If the regression line is continued 
out to FY2029, the average annual per ship estimate for Intermediate Maintenance cost 
increases steadily to an estimate of over $8.2M.  That represents a 194% increase over 
the estimated cost for FY2010. 
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7. Other Maintenance Cost Regression Analysis 
Figure 18.  Estimated Platform Age Relationship to Average Annual Other 
Maintenance Cost per Ship 
The Other Maintenance category encompasses maintenance costs not captured in 
the previously analyzed categories, and is the smallest contributor to overall maintenance 
costs.  Figure 18 shows the regression estimate for average annual Other Maintenance 
cost per ship potted with the corresponding VAMOSC data for comparison.  Similar to 
both Scheduled Maintenance and Modernization, the Other Maintenance sub-category 
represented a challenge for regression analysis given the volatility in the underlying cost 
data.  Regression analysis results did produce a best fit estimate line that shows a 
definitive upward trend over time, increasing from $474K as an average annual per ship 
estimate in FY1987, to $849K per ship in FY2010.  Continued out to FY2029, the 
average annual estimate per ship for Other Maintenance increases to $1.2M, show a 
significant upward trend in cost as related to platform age. 
 37
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Regression analysis of maintenance cost associated with the CG-47 cruiser class 
yielded results that differed from those found by IDA in attempting to establish a 
relationship between the age of a platform and the cost required to maintain it.  While 
IDA found no significant relationship between cost and age, results found in this analysis 
indicate a statistically significant relationship between specific maintenance cost, 
steaming hours, and platform age.  Not all categories of maintenance, however, showed 
the upward trend expected with increasing age. 
Maintenance required for correction of material deficiencies resulting from use, 
such as Scheduled and Un-Scheduled Depot-Level Maintenance, showed the upward 
relationship with age that was anticipated prior to analysis.  Modernization cost, however, 
showed a negative age-cost relationship, indicating a decline in Modernization cost with 
age. 
In contrast to the IDA study, this analysis does show a statistically significant 
relationship between platform age and maintenance cost.  Most notably, the statistical 
relationship between Intermediate-Level Maintenance cost, platform age, and steaming 
hours.  Using these regression results to forecast future cost showed that Intermediate-
Level Maintenance cost can be expected to increase by an average, per ship amount of 
$209.5K for each additional year of service expected of a CG-47 class cruiser. 
While Intermediate-Level Maintenance regression results were strong—showing 
strong statistical significance between cost and all three variables—all four other 
maintenance cost categories showed statistically significant relationships between 
maintenance cost and platform age.  Additionally, steaming hours lagged one year 
showed strong statistical significance in both the Scheduled and Un-Scheduled Depot-
Level Maintenance categories. 
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Coefficient values for each of the five maintenance category regression models 
were combined, and yielded a predicted average annual increase in maintenance cost of 
$382.1K per ship, for each additional year of service.  That amount, although in addition 
to current annual maintenance funding per ship, included the estimated $75K annual 
decrease in Modernization cost per ship. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Fiscal challenges facing the Navy have created a situation where policy objectives 
and mission requirements driving the force structure of the surface fleet must be re-
evaluated in an effort to ensure that the highest priority objectives do not go unmet.  
Force capability goals for the future surface fleet must be redefined with the realization 
that budget restrictions necessitate a reduction in overall resources.  Congress must 
choose to either fund the surface fleet deemed necessary by Navy leaders to implement 
current national policy, work with the President to change national policy, or accept the 
inevitable limitations of the force they are able to fund.  By forcing the Navy to trade 
effectiveness for efficiency, Congress will put the Navy in a position where they are 
forced to submit what the Senate Armed Services Committee deemed, “an overly 
optimistic procurement strategy for large surface combatants,” with program changes 
that, “inject a great deal of instability into the SCN11 accounts” (O'Rourke, Navy CG(X) 
Cruiser Program: Background for Congress, 2010, p. 8). 
The good news, however, is that the Navy seems to have found a compromise in 
the balance between new ship procurement and old ship sustainment that will postpone a 
reduction in current capabilities.  By restarting DDG-51 production, the fleet is assured 
the addition of newly constructed large surface combatants in the future, and the 
budgeting stability gained will likely enhance the accuracy of future budget estimates.  
With the theoretical affordability of modernization shown in this thesis, coupled with the 
reduction in funding requirements resulting from avoiding new ship development, the 
Navy appears to have found the most realistic route available to pursue a 313-ship fleet. 
                                                 
11 Ship Construction, Navy (SCN). 
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Budget stability gained through the DDG-51 program alone is not enough to 
afford Navy decision-makers the predictability needed to ensure force structure decisions 
are realistically attainable within fiscal constraints.  The Navy needs the ability to predict 
how O&S costs will behave based on the age of their current fleet.  Trends present 
throughout this analysis, indicate that O&S costs associated with the CG-47 class will 
continue to increase as the ships in the class age; however, the increase in maintenance 
cost alone may not warrant a change is current force structure policy toward the 
development of new Large Surface Combatants.  Further analysis, including equipment 
failure trend data, readiness metrics, and material condition scores12, is needed to better 
encompass the broad array of costs that could potentially be attributed to the age of a 
ship.  Operating and Support cost, while a good measure of overall ship costs, contain 
many categories that fluctuate based on factors completely independent of platform age. 
The ability to better predict future funding requirements is even more significant 
given that the analysis of the Navy’s latest shipbuilding plan, from both the CBO and the 
CRS, indicates that, with the historical average of $15 billion per year for shipbuilding, 
the Navy “will not be able to afford all of the purchases in the 2011 plan” (O'Rourke, 
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background Issues for Congress, 2010, p. 
1).  Given that a substantial increase in SCN funding is unlikely, the possibility that a 
313-ship Navy will not materialize is a likelihood that must be considered.  The 
implications for the Navy posed by an inability to reach force structure levels required to 
implement national policy are complex.  The Navy has structured its 313-ship plan to fill 
present and future requirements determined to be responsibilities of the Navy under 
current national policy.  If Congress is unable to provide sufficient funding to realize the 
Navy’s force structure goals, they must be cognizant of potential risks and be ready to 
accept possible consequences. 
In the near term, the Navy’s plan appears to be achievable, and the supremacy of 
the U.S. fleet is not in jeopardy.  After the current FYDP, however, the plan becomes 
                                                 
12 Classified as secret in 2009 and no longer available publically, “The reports, filed by the Board of 
Inspection and Survey, or INSURV, contain the findings of meticulous, days-long inspections that cover 
every detail of the workings of surface ships, aircraft carriers and submarines (Ewing, 2009).” 
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potentially problematic and will require constant assessment and adjustment in order to 
maintain a realistic chance of success.  However, in light of this initial look into the effect 
of age on the CG-47 class, the U.S. Navy’s decision to extend the life of the class, over 
the development and procurement of new technology, was likely a well-founded 
decision.  The Navy, and Congress, will no doubt adjust to changes in funding levels and 
requirements, and in the mean time, the current fleet of Aegis cruisers and destroyers will 
continue on the path to modernization that will keep them at the forefront of naval 
combat effectiveness throughout the world.   
With no current ability to predict future O&S costs with any certainty, future 
analysis of the CG-47 class, and others, will be warranted in an effort to establish a 
relationship between age and cost as the platform continues to mature.  Additionally, 
modernization costs associated with keeping an older class of ships capable exist outside 
the scope of O&S data, and warrants introduction into future analysis.  The ability to 
understand the cost associated with the CG-47 class will help in making future class 
service life decisions and aid leadership in naval force structure planning. 
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